The publication of the Winograd Commission’s final report on the 2006 Lebanon War has not caused the political destabilization in Jerusalem that could have been expected a couple of months ago. There are several reasons for this, but two stand out above the rest: the report presented the image of an idealized (on a political and military level) Israel that no longer exists. And if the Minister of Defense, Ehud Bark (Labor Party), withdraws from Ehud Olmert’s coalition government, forcing elections to be moved forward, Benjamin Netanyahu (Likud) will win.

(From Jerusalem) THE LAST FEW DAYS HAVE BEEN stormy in Jerusalem, and not only because of the snowfall that paralyzed the city for a few days, but above all because of the publication of the Winograd Commission’s final report on the 2006 Lebanon War.

Yet the political storm has been smaller than on other occasions, and the impact of the final report did not generate the destabilization that followed the publication of the partial report in July of 2007.

THE IMAGE OF AN IDEAL JERUSALEM

“It is illusory to think that the military’s behavior standards have not changed or been affected by the wars and the very tasks of occupation and inoccupation” Perhaps the most accurate commentary on this process was made by a television analyst, who claimed that the age of the members of the Winograd Commission played against its favor. As they were old people, the analyst maintained that they presented the image of an ideal Israel, and its own values as political and military behavior referents, which no longer exists.

It is illusory to think that the current politicians would behave in accordance with the criteria that ran Israel forty or fifty years ago, and that they would take responsibility for their acts, which would entail high political prices and involve resignations and withdrawal from the public view and the fulfillment of any promises that they might have made in the past.

It is also illusory to think that the military’s behavior standards have not changed or been affected by the wars and the very tasks of occupation and inoccupation (read: Gaza and the West Bank) which to a large extent moved parts of the army away from their own proper military duties and provoked conflicts with Palestinian and Israeli civil sectors, conflicts which are normal with the police, but not with the military.

THE PREPARATION CAMPAIGN

Despite all of this, the resignations of the commander-in-chief, Dan Halutz, and other high army officials, have shown the differences between the political and military norms.

“Even though the Winograd Report was negative and condemnatory towards the politicians that governed Israel during July and August of 2006, the presentation of the final text was, in a certain sense, ambiguous” We are referring to the fact that Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, far from accepting the responsibility for the outbreak and outcome of the war, carried out an intense preparation campaign to face up to the final report, maintaining that errors were committed and that it was not his job to take responsibility for them and withdraw from politics, but instead to fix them.

Even though the Winograd Report was negative and condemnatory towards the politicians that governed Israel during July and August of 2006, the presentation of the final text was, in a certain sense, ambiguous, with the members of the commission supporting the need for an Israeli ground operation during the final sixty hours of the war, which, militarily, was unfinished and in its wake left many victims on both sides.

THE REPORT’S AMBIGUITY

Local military experts maintain that the manner in which the operation was carried out, and its brief duration, served political ends better than military objectives. However, Olmert and his followers, with Winograd’s statements, managed to dilute this criticism and create a sensation of ambiguity that undermined the importance of the protests of reserve officials and family members of fallen soldiers of the war, who demanded Ehud Olmert’s immediate resignation.

This whole process was reinforced by the Winograd Commission’s decision to not levy personal character accusations against anyone (as it did in the partial report half a year ago) reinforcing ambiguity, which is convenient for the current government and its leader.

EHUD BARAK’S DILEMMA

“Barak’s dilemma is complex. If the elections are moved forward, they will result in a victory for the Likud Party and Benjamin Netanyahu, Olmert’s principal political enemy” But the man who plays a fundamental role in this storm is the current Minister of Defense and leader of the Labor Party, Ehud Barak. Upon joining the government several months ago, he had promised to demand Olmert’s resignation when the Winograd Commission’s final report was published.

In case Olmert did not resign, Barak, together with the Labor Party, would withdraw from the government coalition, forcing new elections to be held.

However, Barak is currently adhering to the prevalent ambiguity, and it seems that his political promises have melted along with the snow in Jerusalem.

IF THERE ARE ELECTIONS, NETANYAHU WILL WIN

Barak’s dilemma is complex. If the elections are moved forward, they will result in a victory for the Likud Party and Benjamin Netanyahu: Olmert, and also Barak’s, principal political enemy. In the Labor Party itself, a large chunk of the ministers and members of parliament are pushing for the continuation of Olmert’s coalition government, given that they that many of them would not be a reelected in an election in the near future for, among other things, having supported the Lebanon War and taken part in unsuccessful decisions that have not led to a favorable outcome.

Furthermore, Barak is swamped with the plans for military restructuring and faces the grave crisis in Gaza and Egypt’s border issues. Although a resignation would be fulfilling the political promise that gave him the support of the Labor party to take office, it could be seen as a failure to fulfill his state duties that he assumed as Minister of Defense, and a practical failure, which would weaken the possibility of him or the Labor Party getting elected in the future even more.

DECISION MAKING AND POOR MILITARY PREPARATION

To this complex scene, we must add that the Winograd Commission was careful not to repeat the mistake of the Agranat Commission (which examined the failures of the Yom Kippur War of October 1973) which placed the responsibility for the military failure squarely on the army’s shoulders, practically exonerating the politicians, who at the time were headed by Golda Meir and Moshe Dayan.

The Winograd Commission established that the mistakes were due to the deficient political decision making process as much as the poor military preparation and the lack of leadership in both areas.

For the army, the Winograd Report is both an accusatory document and a launching pad for a serious internal revision and changes for the future.

POLITICS CHANGED THEIR STYLE

“Israeli politics are immediate, lacking ideological as well as strategic considerations, and are very far from the proposed styles and criteria used many decades ago” The weak intensity of the storms in Jerusalem was reinforced by the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations, given that Olmert has announced that they are still standing, but left the matter of the possible division of Jerusalem open to an uncertain future, since the Shas Party (ultra-orthodox Sephardic) has threatened to withdraw from the government coalition the very day that a negotiation of Jerusalem should begin.

If we take into consideration the magnitude of the trauma that the 2006 Lebanon War caused in Israel, the weak intensity of the recently passed storms and the return to normality (in politics as well) they strengthen the assertion that today, Israeli politics are immediate, lacking ideological as well as strategic considerations, and are very far from the proposed styles and criteria used many decades ago by those who established the State of Israel.