The Asian economies, incredibly dynamic in recent times, and believed to be the principal global economic motor, are without a doubt a voice to be taken into account. But that voice would ring out louder and more clearly if it were more unified.

(London) AT THE G-20 SUMMIT HELD in London during the beginning of April, the British Prime Minister Gordon Brown highlighted that we could be looking at the emergence of a “new economic world order”. The Asian economies, incredibly dynamic in recent times, and believed by many to be the principal global economic motor of the relatively near future, were without a doubt a voice to be heard at the summit. But it is also clear that the more unified said voice is, the louder and more clearly it will ring out.

Yet achieving that unity is difficult because the distinct regional integration projects in Asia have traditionally run into numerous obstacles, and this is a dynamic that is currently being maintained and is forecast to remain in the short and medium term.

COMMON IDENTITY MISSING

In this sense, it is likely that the lack of a common identity to serve as a foundation for true regional construction; the weight of history, particularly important in Asia and in many cases marked by memories of war and occupation; the existence of numerous unresolved conflicts; the insistence on integration projects principally designed by the elite; the lack of attention paid to the concrete realities and problems of the nations involved; the important role in the region played by foreign powers like the United States; and the inability to introduce mechanisms to ensure that the measures and decisions adopted be carried out will all continue to bog down the various projects.

These are some difficulties that, if anything, are made even more obvious when taking into account ASEAN, which is not only considered the most advanced integration project in Asia, but even one of the most advanced projects in the entire world, and yet is continuously weakened by internal differences; notable differences in development; the diversity of political, religious, belief, and even economic systems; and the diverse internal divisions plaguing some of its members. This is something that we have been able to see over and over again in Thailand as of late.

However, as it is known, ASEAN is certainly not the area’s only regional project, and it appears to be ever clearer that the existence of an increasingly wider range of regional frameworks for cooperation –and even integration–, in part a consequence of the lack of a common identity and, closely related to this, of the lack of an agreement regarding what the concept of a “region” means in reference to Asia, will not facilitate the consolidation of any of said projects either.

OPPORTUNITY IN VIEW OF THE CRISIS

However, and unlike what would probably be expected, the circumstances caused by the current economic crisis do not constitute another obstacle to integration but rather, on the contrary, appear to present a good opportunity to give it a boost. And yet, this is logical if we keep in mind that it is in the field of economics where there has been the least amount of reticence to deepen integration.

And so, as was the case during the Asian crisis of the late nineties, a large part of Asia appears to be in favor of a regional solution to the problem.

In this sense, within the framework of ASEAN, the member states have once again committed themselves to halting protectionist tendencies which, as is true throughout the rest of the planet, could easily be present in the region in view of the current economic crisis. To that effect, within the context of the summit held at the end of February, the members of the organization stated their desire to keep their borders open to commerce, services and investments, refrain from lifting trade barriers and adopt anti-protectionist measures.

BARRIERS IN THE HEART OF ASEAN

And this is in spite of the undeniable fact that important non-tariff trade barriers –particularly regulatory in character– persist in the heart of ASEAN. They are much more visible in the service and investment sectors and amount to a significant hindrance to regional economic integration, up to the point where it is even possible to say that the supposed single market, which, according to ASEAN’s Economic Community should be established by 2015, might not even have materialized by the year 2025.

Furthermore, and in spite of the regional agreements reached, it is not strange that, on a domestic level, the leaders of ASEAN’s member states recognized that in light of the current global recession, the adoption of measures favoring national products was “normal”.

But it is obvious that the desire to come up with a coordinated response to the crisis exists, and as was the case with the crisis in the late nineties, the framework within which it will be easiest to articulate a response to the crisis is ASEAN+3, with the three Northeast Asian states –and especially China and Japan– being called upon to spearhead the search for a solution. This is especially important if we keep in mind that together, Japan and China –the planet’s second and third biggest economies– have important currency reserves that, with the present lack of liquidity taken into account, could grant them an unprecedented weight in the global economy.

NETWORK OF EAST ASIAN THINK TANKS

And so, together with the agreements reached by ASEAN, in a broader context, the states in the region are advocating for an expansion and multilateralization of Chiang Mai’s initiative, a type of monetary snake set in motion as a part of the reforms introduced in the region since the late nineties, with the goal of avoiding the repetition of a crisis like the one the region experienced during those years.

This is a measure that must be added to those of the Asian Bond Fund (ABF) and the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), which, however, have a weakness in that they focus on the purely financial aspects of the problem. This is precisely why the ideal complement would be the establishment of infrastructure and financing programs of those very measures, along the same lines, for example, as the Investment and Infrastructure Fund, whose establishment was recently proposed by the Network of East Asian Think Tanks (NEAT).

These are initiatives that, as I was saying, the states in Northeast Asia appearing willing to lead: calling for regional cooperation and insisting on the importance of strengthening the bodies responsible for the supervision of the regional financial markets.

JAPAN WILL INJECT FUNDS

In this sense, Japan has announced that it will inject funds into the region in the form of Official Development Assistance (ODA) and other public and private funds, aside from stressing the importance of setting transnational infrastructure projects in motion and having the Secretary-General of ASEAN, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Asian economy institutions assume the responsibility of coordinating the regional measures. Regional measures that, by the way, it believes should even include industrial development and institutional reform programs.

In an analogous way, it is hoped that the People’s Republic of China –which appears to be taking an especially strong hit from the crisis during the first semester of 2009– recovers for the second semester and consequently gives a boost to East Asian growth, helping it reach 5,3 percent (according to the World Bank’s figures), and as such be above the other emerging regions, as well as Europe and the United States.

In keeping with this leadership and desire to reach an agreement, and in an unprecedented event that nevertheless can be seen as having been caused by their habit of coordinating their positions –generated, among other things, by their participation in the Conversations of Six–Japan, South Korea and China met last December 13 in Fukuoka with the objective of creating a framework for a common response to the global recession. It was a meeting that should have continued as a working breakfast, which should have been held during the ASEAN meetings that were scheduled for a few days ago in Pattaya, Thailand, but were canceled due to protests against Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva’s government, which have even caused a state of emergency to be proclaimed in the Southeast Asian country.

As such, it is clear that East Asia –in particular through ASEAN+3– looks like it is in a good position to make an important contribution to solving the crisis, fundamentally based on three pillars: ASEAN itself, whose secretary general Surin Pitsuwan represented the organization at the G-20 summit held in London; China; and Japan. In addition to its effects on the global economic recovery, such a contribution will probably be beneficial for the regional processes of ASEAN and ASEAN+3.

In this sense, the most important issue is not whether the crisis will strengthen the regional Asian processes, which it might do, but rather how “Asian” the new economic world order heralded by Gordon Brown in London will be.