Moving beyond the last minute cancellation of Ahmadinejad’s trip to Brazil, what is certain is that Iran has strengthened its presence in Latin America over the last three years, on a political-ideological level as well as in relation to trade.

IN THE LAST FIVE YEARS, Iran’s foreign policy has shifted from Africa towards Latin America, with the goal of, as Ahmadinejad expressed to the Venezuelan ambassador in Tehran, David Velázquez, “tying up” the United States.

“The notorious shift to the left of many Latin American countries during the first decade of the twenty-first century has allowed Iran to have more success in its attempt to improve relations”

No one considers it strange that the starting point for Ahmadinejad’s Latin American policy is the formation of an anti-American axis with Venezuela. During his July, 2006 trip to Tehran, President Hugo Chávez said in a University of Tehran auditorium, “We must save the human race and put an end to the American empire”. A year later, Chávez visited Tehran once again and declared an “Axis of unity” against the United States.

During the International Conference on Latin America held in Tehran in February, 2007, Iran’s vice-minister of foreign relations, Mehdi Mostafavi, announced the opening of embassies in Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Nicaragua and Uruguay, and of a representative office in Bolivia. Likewise, a series of Latin American countries would open embassies in Iran. Iranian penetration, political and economic, into the Latin American continent during the past three years has had a great impact.

THE IRAN-LATIN AMERICA RELATIONSHIP

What is certain is that Iran’s interest in Latin America as a region and its bilateral ties with some of the countries in the Southern Cone are also deeply rooted and very solid. Ever since the end of the war with Iraq, Iran has shared a close ideological relationship with Cuba, and political ties with Venezuela since the co-foundation of OPEC in the 1960s. These bilateral relationships are longstanding.

In foreign policy, Iran’s non-aligned position has forced it to look for countries with similar ideological views.

From a diplomatic and economic point of view, the United States’ efforts to keep Iran isolated forced the latter to carry out an active foreign policy, and finally, the election of a reformist president in 1997 made it possible for countries like Brazil to join Iran in resisting American pressure with enough confidence.

The notorious shift to the left of many Latin American countries during the first decade of the twenty-first century has allowed Iran to have more success in its attempt to improve relations.

From Ahmadinejad’s point of view, instead of passively responding to the United States’ attempt to politically and economically isolate Iran and become the dominant player in the Middle East, Iran should mobilize itself aggressively in the United States’ own backyard as a means of unsettling the country, or at least attempt to.

WHAT AHMADINEJAD IS LOOKING FOR

Some European colleagues and Latin American analysts claim that Latin America’s willingness to get closer to Iran indicates the alarming extent to which the United States’ prestige has fallen in the region. Personally, I do not think that it is “alarming”, although it is true that in many South American countries American prestige is not at its high point. Taking advantage of this apparent weakness, the Iranian regime’s stated objectives are:

“During a visit to Iran by Brazil’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, his Iranian counterpart said that ‘Iran prioritizes South America in its foreign policy and, on the matter, Brazil enjoys a special position’”

ONE
To gain the support of Latin America in counteracting the pressure from the United States and Europe to keep Iran from developing nuclear power (Remember that Venezuela and Cuba, together with Syria, were the only countries that supported the Iranian nuclear program during the February, 2006 vote at the United Nations’ International Atomic Energy Agency).

TWO
Ahmadinejad wants to counterattack the United States in its own hemisphere and, perhaps, destabilize the governments of the country’s friends, with the goal of negotiating with Washington from a stronger position.

THREE
The unresolved economic and social problems in Iran have caused the Iranian president’s image to fall to varying degrees within his own country, and Ahmadinejad wants to demonstrate to his people that he is received as a hero abroad.

POLITCS AND TRADE
The first “anti-imperialist vehicles” of a joint endeavor between Iran and a Latin American country were the 4000 tractors produced annually in Ciudad Bolívar, which have a symbolic value as agents of revolutionary change. In Venezuela, the majority are given away for free, or rented out at a discount to socialist cooperatives in control of land approved by the government. Farsi is being taught in colleges. In a four billion dollar project, Iran will help build oil deposit platforms in the Orinoco delta in exchange for Venezuelan investments. An Iranian company is constructing hundreds of apartments for poor Venezuelans. The public housing project has brought more than 400 Iranian engineers and specialists to Venezuela, where many have learned basic Spanish. Venezuela has already turned into Iran’s port of entry for trips to the region. There is currently a weekly flight from Caracas to Tehran, with a layover in Demascus, operated by the Venezuelan and Iranian national airlines.

THE RELATIONSHIP WITH BRAZIL

During President Mohammad Khatami’s trip to Caracas in February, 2004 to attend the G-15 summit of non-aligned countries, he met the then president-elect of Brazil, Lula da Silva, and they spoke about bilateral trade, with significant results. Since then, Brazil’s exports to Iran have doubled, and for many years Brazil was Tehran’s largest “Latin American trade partner, with its exports to Iran as high as Turkey’s”. However, when Ahmadinejad tried to set up an official visit in 2007 – in order to make a trip to Brasilia, after having spoken at the United Nations General Assembly and visited Venezuela and Bolivia – Brazil declined, citing “the impossibility of reconciling Lula’s agenda with the Iranian president’s”. Regardless, his hesitancy to meet with Ahmadinejad did not keep President Lula da Silva from publicly supporting the Iranian nuclear energy program and suggesting that Iran “should not be punished just for the West’s suspicion that it is trying to create an atomic bomb”.

“It is obvious that Iran’s political and strategic position in Latin America strengthens the regime in Tehran and diminishes the possibility that the United Nations will convince it to halt its nuclear project”

During a visit to Iran in November, 2008 by Brazil’s foreign minister, Celso Amorim, his Iranian counterpart said that “Iran prioritizes South America in its foreign policy and, on the matter, Brazil enjoys a special position” and that Tehran and Brasilia share the same interests regarding numerous global affairs, which can be used as an impetus for bilateral talks. Amorim described the deepening of ties with Iran as a priority in Brazilian foreign policy. He also referred to his meeting with Mottaki as a “decisive point” in Brazilian/Iranian relations and hopes that the presidents of the two nations’ visits bring those relations to a new level. On that occasion, President Ahmadinejad said that there are no barriers to the deepening of ties with Brazil. “Global political systems are going downhill, and we should help ourselves by working to establish a new political order”. Recently, after Durban II, Ahmadinejad expressed hope that his next visit with President Luiz Lula Da Silva could help to build a friendship between the two nations.

THE DEFENSE OF IRANIAN INTERESTS

It is obvious that Iran’s political and strategic position in Latin America strengthens the regime in Tehran and diminishes the possibility that the United Nations – supported by diplomatic and economic international pressure – will convince it to halt its nuclear project.

The proven role played by Iran and Hezbollah in the worst terrorist attacks on the continent, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, is a bad omen for the future. In the case that Iran’s vital interests, such as the continuance of its nuclear project, should be threatened by the international community (by the United States or Israel), Latin America would be the perfect stage from which to retaliate, either directly or with Hezbollah’s support.

“Growing anti-Semitism, which was recently witnessed in Venezuela, could add to the existing sectarian confusion in some countries”

In the long run, the exportation of the radical and religious Shia ideological teachings could reach and exert an influence on the broadest sectors of society, especially the poor and underprivileged and, in this way, add another element of instability and radicalization in a continent plagued by socioeconomic hardships.

Growing anti-Semitism, which was recently witnessed in Venezuela, could add to the existing sectarian confusion in some countries; the widespread presence of Iran and Hezbollah and their activity in Latin America goes beyond the political, economic, social and cultural levels, and comes dangerously close to being incompatible with democracy, threatening not only the interests of foreign players, but also possibly the very stability of the countries in which they are based.